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Abstract 
Objectives: To evaluate the effect of Care Quality Commission (CQC) external 
inspections of acute trusts on adverse event rates in the English National Health 
Service (NHS). 
Methods: Interrupted time series analysis including all acute NHS trusts in England 
(n=155) using two control groups (new versus historical inspection regime and trusts 
not inspected). Multilevel random-coefficients modelling of 1) rates of falls with harm 
and 2) pressure ulcers, from April 2012 to June 2016, was undertaken using the new, 
resource-intensive regime of CQC inspections as an intervention. Data used in the 
model included dates and type of inspection, patient safety indicators, demographic 
characteristics and financial risk of hospitals. 
Results: In one year, CQC inspected 66 acute trusts (42% of all English trusts) using 
their new regime and 46 (30%) using their previous one. Prior to inspections being 
announced, rates of falls with harm and pressure ulcers were improving in both 
intervention and control hospitals. The announcement of an inspection did not affect 
either indicator. After inspections, rates of falls with harm improved more slowly and 
pressure ulcers rates no longer improved for trusts inspected using both regimes. 
Conclusions: Neither form of external inspection was associated with positive, 
clinically significant effects on adverse event rates. Any improvement happening 
before the announced CQC inspections slowed after the inspection. 
 
Keywords: Quality of health care, external inspection, accreditation, interrupted time 
series analysis. 
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Introduction 
The English National Health Service (NHS), like all health systems, has unwarranted 
variations in quality and clinical outcomes,1 and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
exists to regulate and improve quality.2 CQC ratings are a form of inspection-based 
accreditation, which is a common approach to quality improvement,3 although 
evidence on its effectiveness is inconsistent and of low quality.4 CQC sets standards, 
monitors compliance, undertakes on-site inspections and has enforcement powers.5 It 
can request compliance actions, modify conditions of registration, issue warning 
notices, recommend trusts are put XQGHUµspecial measures¶ and even prosecute Trust 
Boards.6 
 
Economic theory suggests that in a market, organizaWLRQVFRPSHWHIRUµFXVWRPHUV¶In 
the NHS, competition and provider numbers are often limited, so the main incentive 
to provide quality health care is reputational concern.7, 8 Any approach that relies on 
performance measures carries the risk that trusts will engage in gaming behaviours to 
gain perceived advantage.8 
 
$VLGHIURPJDPLQJWUXVWVPLJKWµLPSURYH¶following an inspection through various 
mechanisms.9 Pre-inspection, trusts can self-assess their level of compliance and 
obtain information from trusts previously inspected. Any remedial action undertaken 
can increase awareness of safety and increase reporting of adverse events. During 
inspections, regulators may suggest improvements, and post-visit, alongside 
regulator-directed changes, organizations can make changes based on lessons learned. 
Stakeholders (for example, FRPPLVVLRQHUVDQGSDWLHQWV¶JURXSV) can influence 
organizations to improve and the publication of inspection results may lead to further 
changes. These potential CQC improvement mechanisms have been explored 
qualitatively but the lack of a system-wide quantitative examination of CQC 
inspections means their effects remain uncertain.4 
 
&4&¶Vperceived lack of sensitivity to detecting or avoiding unacceptable failures of 
care10 led to modification of the inspection regime in 2013.11 Historically, the &4&¶V
teams of 2-5 inspectors, visiting a trust over 2-3 days, focused on whether a trust met 
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28 essential standards, required improvement or required enforcement actions to meet 
the standards.12 The new regime13 outlines legally enforceable fundamental standards 
of care, uses µintelligent monitoring¶ of over 150 indicators, uses more inspectors for 
longer, rates core services and the whole trust, allows for unannounced visits post-
inspection and permits joint inspection (with the financial regulator, NHS 
Improvement). The new regime uses more resources, but the effect on processes and 
outcomes has been not quantitatively evaluated.14  
 
We sought to explore the effect of external inspections of acute trusts by the CQC on 
rates of adverse events in the English NHS. 
Methods 
Study design and setting 
We undertook a controlled interrupted time-series analysis using data on adverse 
events prospectively and routinely reported by all English acute NHS trusts (n=155) 
from April 2012 to June 2016. Five trusts had missing data and were excluded. The 
interruption point was a CQC inspection between September 2013 and September 
2014. In that period, a new inspection regime was introduced and applied to 66 acute 
NHS Trusts. Since CQC performs comprehensive inspections (at least) once every 
three years,5 some trusts were inspected under the old regime (n=46), whilst others 
were not inspected (n=38), which permitted us to use two non-equivalent controls. 
The announcement of the inspection occurring, 16 to 20 weeks before a visit, was 
treated as a further intervention point.  
 
Outcome measures 
We focused on two adverse events which are proxies for quality of nursing care15. 
Falls with harm are unplanned or unintentional descent to the floor requiring at least 
first aid, minor treatment or extra observation or medication16. Pressure ulcers are 
those that developed 72 hours or more after patient admission and are categorized 
using the European Pressure Ulcer Scale.16 Data on these outcomes are collected 
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monthly in a single-day census by trained staff using the NHS Safety Thermometer 
(NHS ST),17 a national quality improvement initiative that rewards trusts for 
collecting high(er) quality safety data.18 Falls with harm and pressure ulcers are 
indicators of quality used in CQC documentation and inspections, but are not used in 
CQC µintelligent monitoring¶algorithms to target inspections.5 
 
Statistical analysis 
We used a multilevel random-coefficients linear model for estimating changes in the 
level and trend in rates of falls with harm and pressure ulcers after each interruption. 
 
The multilevel model estimates intervention effects for an average trust and for all 
individual trusts. To determine the pre-inspection change rate, time was used as an 
explanatory variable. A dummy variable, indicating a level change in adverse events 
rates, and an interaction term (i.e. group*time*post-intervention time), indicating a 
change in slope, were included in the model. Time was centred on the inspection 
month. In the case of not-inspected hospitals, an interruption was introduced in 
November 2013 (i.e. the month with the highest number of inspections). Outcome 
variables were logarithmically transformed, and coefficients were exponentiated to 
express them in the original scale. The assumptions of uncorrelated model residuals 
and normally distributed random effects were met. 
 
We included descriptive data for each acute NHS trust (see Table 1) to minimize 
confounding. Because of changes in the commissioning system, the period between 
October 2012 and April 2013 was introduced as a dummy variable. Confounding 
variables were included one by one in the adjusted model and the most parsimonious 
model is reported based on the Lowest Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table 1 Descriptive information used for each acute NHS trust and its sources. 
Descriptive information about trusts Data Source 
Number of beds  CQC inspection report 
Geographical location CQC inspection report 
Trust size (Teaching, large, medium, 
small, specialist) 
CQC inspection report 
Foundation Trust status CQC inspection report 
Number of trust sites CQC website 
Catchment population CQC inspection report 
Reporting culture rating (2016) CQC website 
z-score for potential underreporting of 
safety incidents (2013) 
Reported by National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) in CQC 
website 
Dates and number of inspections since 
September 2012 
CQC website 
Type of inspection CQC inspection report 
Ratings given during the first inspection 
under the new regime 
CQC website 
Financial performance during quarter of 
inspection 
Monitor or Trust Development 
Authority 
Mergers Monitor 
Enforcement actions (special measures) Monitor 
Deprivation levels of the area served by 
the main commissioner 
NHS Digital for deprivation indexes and 
annual accounts for main commissioner 
Monthly numbers of staff NHS Digital 
 
To mitigate possible time-series error term correlation, we introduced auto-correlation 
structures from 1 to 12 and compared different models using a likelihood ratio test, 
reporting the most parsimonious model. A cosine function in the pressure ulcer model 
accounts for seasonal changes.19 To test robustness of findings, we estimated models 
for the whole sample and for a sub-sample matched on foundation trust status, 
reporting culture, and special measures status (See Appendix 1). 
 
To assess clinical/policy significance (as well as statistical significance) we used 95% 
confidence intervals for rate of change before and after announcements and 
inspections, and change in levels the month after each interruption, with p-values 
<0.05 considered statistically significant. Analyses were performed in Stata SE/14.0 
(StataCorp LP. 2015. College Station, Texas). 
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Results 
Missing NHS ST data meant five trusts were excluded from the analysis. The 38 
uninspected trusts had a median time to an inspection before or after the observation 
period of five (interquartile range 2-7) months. Trusts inspected under the new regime 
were less likely to be Foundation Trusts (53% versus 71%, p=0.02), more likely to be 
under special measures (28% versus 1%, p<0.001) and more likely to be rated as poor 
or with significant concerns about reporting culture (67% versus 42%, p=0.002) 
(Table 2). Figure 1 shows the distribution of inspections over the observation period. 
The mean rates of falls with harm and pressure ulcers in the observation period are 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 2 Characteristics of acute NHS Trusts included in the comparison of old and 
QHZUHJLPHRI&4&¶VLQVSHFWLRQV 
 Old regime New regime No inspection 
p-value 
 n=46 n=66 n=38 
Foundation Trust 31 (67%) 35 (53%) 29 (76%) 0.047 
Type of trust 
Large acute trust 14 (30.4%) 18 (27%) 9 (24%) 0.80 
Medium acute trust 14 (30.4%) 19 (29%) 12 (32%)  
Small acute trust 7 (15.2%) 13 (19.7%) 6 (16%)  
Acute teaching trust 5 (11%) 13 (19.7%) 7 (18%)  
Acute specialist trust 6 (13%) 3 (4.6%) 4 (10%)  
NHS England region 
North 16 (35%) 17 (26%) 16 (42%) 0.48 
Midlands and East 15 (33%) 18 (27%) 10 (26%)  
South 9 (19%) 18 (27%) 9 (24%)  
London 6 (13%) 13 (20%) 3 (8%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 658.5 (461, 1002) 745 (562, 1020) 742 (491, 1024) 0.68 
Population in thousands, 
median (IQR) 465 (325.7, 610) 460 (350, 600) 450 (320, 600) 
0.98 
Special measures 0 (0%) 18 (27%) 1 (3%) <0.001 
Overall rating after first inspection under new regime 
Outstanding 3 (7%) 2 (3%) 3 (8%) 0.85 
Good 12 (27%) 16 (24%) 11 (30%)  
Requires improvement 26 (59%) 41 (62%) 21 (57%)  
Inadequate 3 (7%) 7 (11%) 2 (5%)  
Merged trusts 2 (4%) 8 (12%) 3 (8%) 0.35 
Number of CQC 
inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 3 (2, 4) 0.004 
Months since previous 
inspection, median (IQR) 10 (7, 13) 11 (8, 14) - 
0.39 
CQC reporting culture rating 2016 
Poor 6 (13%) 17 (25.7%) 2 (5%) 0.028 
Significant Concerns 14 (30%) 27 (41%) 13 (34%)  
Good 22 (48%) 21 (31.8%) 19 (50%)  
Outstanding 4 (9%) 1 (1.5%) 4 (11%)  
* Values are mean ± SD, P50 (P25-P75) or n (%). 
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Figure 2 Mean rates of falls with harm and pressure ulcers during the observation 
period. 
 
In the following section, figures show the trend for an average trust in each group for 
the three periods under study. Tables show the absolute values for the slopes and level 
changes observed. The model coefficients are reported in the Appendix 2. 
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Pressure Ulcers 
The mean (95% CI) prevalence of pressure ulcers in April 2012 was 575 (470 to 679) 
for the historical inspection trusts, 590 (500 to 679) for the new inspection regimen 
trusts and 503 (407 to 600) for the uninspected group per 10,000 patients/month.  
 
Rates of pressure ulcers were improving before CQC inspection in all three groups of 
trusts (Table 3, second column). Announcing the inspection had no immediate effect 
in the new regime group and significantly decreased rates in the historical regime 
group (-4.6 [-34.9 to 25.8] vs -47.4 [-81.9 to -12.9] pressure ulcers per 10,000 
patients/month, see Table 3, third column). The rate of improvement remained similar 
to the pre-inspection period (Table 3, fifth column). Post-inspection, no effect was 
seen on the level or trend for any of the three groups (Figure 3). No significant 
changes were observed in the matched subsample (see Appendix 1). 
Falls with harm 
The mean (95% CI) prevalence of falls with harm in April 2012 was 90 (57 to 124) 
for the historical regime trusts, 108 (75 to 142) for new regime trusts and 90 (59 to 
120) for uninspected trusts per 10,000 patients/month. 
  
Rates of falls with harm were improving pre-inspection for all groups (Table 3, 
second column). Announcing the inspection was followed by non-significant changes 
in trend in all groups (Table 3, fifth column). The rate of falls with harm in new 
regime trusts was significantly lower than the one for the historically inspected trusts 
(>WR@YV>WR@IDOOVSHUSDWLHQWV) post-inspection 
announcement (Table 3, third column). 
 
CQC inspections were associated with a slower improvement in rates of falls with 
harm in all groups (Figure 4 and Table 3, sixth column). No significant changes were 
observed in the matched subsample (see Appendix 1).  
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Figure 3 Predicted falls with harm. 
 
Figure 4 Predicted pressure ulcers. 
Figure 3 and 4 show values for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement 
and after inspection by inspection group.  Lines represent the mean rate of pressure ulcers 
obtained from the multilevel model for each period. The first vertical line signals the 
announcement, while the second the inspection. Dash lines show the trends observed during 
the pre inspection period, which were extended for the post announcement and post 
inspection periods. Long-dash lines represent the observed trends in the period between the 
announcement and the inspection. Solid lines show the trends after the inspection. Data for 
the hospitals inspected by the old regime are shown in blue, new regime in red and hospitals 
not inspected in black. 
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Table 3 Predicted changes in the slope and level of falls with harm and pressure ulcers before and after the announcement and inspection. 
 
 
Baseline rates Pre-inspection 
slope 
Change in level Slope 
 
 
Post-
Announcement Post-inspection Post-announcement Post-inspection 
Pressure 
ulcers 
Trusts=150 
Obs=7,291 
New 
regime 561.4 (492.6, 640) -4.8 (-8.9, -0.7) -4.6 (-34.9, 25.8) 4.7 (-23, 32.3) -9.9 (-23.7, 4) -1.2 (-2.9, 0.5) 
Old regime 607.2 (504.3, 731.1) -7 (-13.5, -0.6)* -47.4 (-81.9, -12.9) 23 (-7.7, 53.7) -7.6 (-22.5, 7.4) -0.5 (-2.3, 1.3) 
No 
inspection 572.6 (464.1, 706.5) -7.7 (-14.7, -0.6) 25.9 (-12.1, 63.9) 10.4 (-24, 44.8) -12 (-29.6, 5.6) -2.4 (-4.4, -0.4) 
Falls with 
harm 
Trusts=149 
Obs=6,255 
New 
regime 98 (75.9, 126.4) -2 (-3.4, -0.5) -7.5 (-15.2, 0.15)* 0.09 (-6.8, 7) -0.43 (-3.9, 3) -0.4 (-0.7, -0.05) 
Old regime 184 (128.5, 263.4) -8 (-13.4, -2.6)* 8.8 (-2.9, 20.4) 3.9 (-5, 12.8) -5 (-10.9, 0.9) -0.5 (-0.9, -0.08) 
No 
inspection 101.7 (77.4, 133.7) -2.5 (-5.4, 0.4) -7.2 (-20.1, 5.8) -6.8 (-18.1, 4.5) -0.3 (-6, 5.5) -0.6 (-1, -0.1) 
Values presented in number of events per 10,000 patients/month. Figures were calculated using model coefficients to present the absolute 
instead of relative value. For example, the pre-inspection slope for hospitals inspected by the new regime LVFDOFXODWHGDVH[Sȕ0j ȕ1j*corrected 
time
 ij ȕ6j*new inspection jȕ7j*corrected time new inspection ij 
The estimations of the pre-inspection slope comprise a median (min-max) of 16 (4 - 26) data points per trust. Estimations for the post-
announcement phase comprise four data points per trust, while for the post-inspection period a median (min-max) of 31 (21-34) data points were 
used. Only two trusts had fewer than ten observations for the pre-inspection period. 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
Model for pressure ulcers was adjusted for specialist trusts, while model for falls with harm was adjusted for type of trust. 
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Discussion 
CQC inspections were not associated with changes in the rates of two markers of 
quality: falls with harm and pressure ulcers. Any improvements made prior to the 
CQC inspection were diminished after inspection in an average trust. Historical and 
new regimes had similar effects, as did trusts not inspected at all. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
In the absence of a definitive trial, controlled interrupted times-series is a robust 
design to assess the impact of health policy.20 Our analyses included most English 
acute trusts and a reliable time-series before and after inspections. Intervention points 
differed between trusts in our observation period (12 months), reducing confounding 
from historical events. The lack of effect in our matched ± by potential confounders ± 
group comparison increases confidence in our estimations. 
 
As with all research, there are some limitations. Firstly, statistical phenomena could 
explain adverse events trends. With high rates, any intervention might reduce them 
due to regression to the mean. Low rates may remain stable, as any possibility of 
improvement is reduced due to the floor effect.21 Post-inspection trend changes could 
be an artefact of the interruption point chosen. Since adverse events vary randomly, 
modelling could artificially change levels or trends.  
 
The NHS ST has some strengths: it is publicly available, conducted monthly, 
nationally, uses consistent definitions and standards, facilitates real-time reporting and 
rapid trust responses.17 However, it relies on self-reporting; consequently, variable 
data entry skills, flexible interpretations of operational definitions and variations in 
patient acuity within and between trusts can make it less reliable, and prone to 
µgaming¶.18 We are unaware of any published reliability assessment of the NHS ST, 
and so incorporating random variation into the estimation of effects was impossible.  
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Our choice to use NHS ST data for research purposes was pragmatic: hospitals 
themselves use this dataset to assess their safety levels and the effectiveness of safety 
interventions. CQC inspections and feedback are part of the approach trusts use to 
improve safety and quality. It follows, then, that trusts carrying out improvements will 
look for an impact on their NHS ST and adverse event rates.  
 
Our statistical model estimates each hospital¶VWUDMHFWRU\compared with the average 
performance of inspected trusts. Confidence intervals suggest variability within each 
group.  Intrinsic features of NHS trusts may explain where inspections have an effect 
and where they do not. In 2013, trusts took over responsibility (from two NHS 
agencies) for the NHS ST. Individual truVWV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI1+667PD\KDYH
differed in line with competing priorities and commitment to patient safety, diluting a 
national, coordinated effort and effects. Further subgroup and retrospective 
(qualitative) analysis of implementation could explore this possibility. 
 
Events surrounding or during inspections may change the safety behaviour of NHS 
trusts and the outcomes seen. Examples of potential µexternal biases¶ include: i) NHS 
financial constraints that could have limited resources dedicated to patient safety; ii) 
changes in clinical commissioning ± whilst 17 (11%) of the trusts were inspected 
before clinical commissioning was fully implemented in 2013, this significant reform 
affected organizations for some time post implementation; and iii) several high-profile 
quality improvement initiatives10, 13 that happened alongside our time-series. Such 
external factors influence managerial and clinical priorities and behaviours and may 
contribute to our findings; however, any potential for bias was spread between all 
trusts. 
 
Finally, the type of CQC inspection that trusts experienced was not random.22 Trusts 
inspected by the new regime were more likely to be in special measures. Any trends 
in this group may be partially explained by regression to the mean for the regulatory 
intervention experienced. 
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Strengths and limitations in relation to other studies 
Falls with harm and pressure ulcers are nursing-sensitive outcomes15 influenced by 
the quantity and quality of nursing care.23 The sensitivity of these indicators to CQC-
style external inspections is equivocal. Implementing standard safety practices 
requested by accreditation agencies can be simultaneously associated with lower 
pressure ulcer rates24 and an increase in level and trend of rate of falls after an 
accreditation visit.25 
 
Evidence regarding CQC and its predecessors is primarily qualitative.2, 14 This is the 
first study quantitatively assessing impact of CQC inspections of acute trusts. Walshe 
et al.14 evaluated the &4&¶VQHZinspection regime in its pilot phase, finding that 
whilst acute trusts saw inspection as a catalyst for resuming µon-hold¶ improvement 
activities, inspections were time and resource-consuming.  
 
Changes seen in adverse event levels post-inspection announcement suggests trusts 
may change their behaviour to respond to the demands of the regulator ± an 
anticipatory effect. A recent study examining gaming effects surrounding external 
inspections of cleanliness in English hospitals supports this premise.26 
 
The CQC produces a detailed report about overall hospital performance after each 
inspection. For serious concerns about performance, an enforcement action is issued. 
However, when improvements are requested without enforcement, hospitals may be 
unclear regarding how best to proceed, timescales for implementation, their own 
accountability and standards expected.14 Any potential CQC improvement influence 
can be diluted and delayed with unclear guidance. 
 
CQC inspections allow trusts to validate and showcase WKHLUVHUYLFHV¶ quality.27 CQC 
visits may confirm what providers already know of their deficiencies as well as 
outstanding areas of care.14, 27 NHS providers asked if the benefits of CQC inspections 
justified their costs, gave mixed responses: 38% agreed and 38% disagreed. Many felt 
the µsame benefits could be achieved through a more streamlined approach¶.27 
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Meaning of the study 
Although CQC inspections were not associated with changes on rates of two adverse 
events, this does not mean CQC did not improve overall care quality. The existence of 
the CQC and the possibility of being subject to a rigorous and detailed inspection at 
relatively short notice doubtless provides an incentive for maintaining hospital quality 
and thus managerial reputation. 
 
Alternative explanations for the trend observed may include the diversion of clinical 
teams and managers away from clinical practice and towards implementation of 
improvements achievable in the time available (approximately 20 weeks). CQC 
requires detailed information in advance and holds focus groups with senior staff; all 
requiring trust administrative time.  
 
A change in safety reporting behaviours may also offer some explanation. Sari et al. 
suggest that approximately 56% of falls and 23% of pressure ulcers are reported to 
routine systems.28 The possibility exists, therefore, that increases in falls with harm 
and pressure ulcers observed post inspection reflect an increase in incident reporting 
instead of the number of events. If true, CQC inspections might be driving 
improvements in fundamental processes necessary for quality improvement that are 
not detected in a short time span. 
 
Bevan and Fasolo 29 argue that various models of quality governance exist at various 
times. Whilst a combination of top-down hierarchical approaches, target setting and 
appeals to reputation were the most effective, reputation alone can still be a powerful 
lever.29 Reputation-based governance works when performance information is ranked, 
transparent, understandable by the public and when performance is followed up.29 
Current CQC arrangements may encourage transient organizational change, but, 
arguably, lack the essential components for effective reputation-based governance. 
Reports are publicly available but not easily understandable, hospitals receive a rating 
but no ranking, and accessible tabular or graphical methods for comparing 
performance over time are hard to find. 
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Future research 
Our results suggest that the expectation of future inspection(s) may influence acute 
trust behaviour, but has not led to positive lasting change. With the power to issue 
enforcement actions and monitor remotely, the CQC might consider reducing the 
burdensome (and resource-intensive) method of comprehensive inspections. The 
optimal µGRVH¶RILQVSHFWLRQrequired for efficient scrutiny of trusts is unknown.  
 
Bevan and Hood8 suggest that informing institutions how and when their performance 
will be measured is an open invitation to game the monitoring system.8 Adding 
randomness to oversight (and evaluating the effects) could increase certainty that 
observed improvement is real. Several attempts to improve external oversight of the 
NHS have been deployed historically: diverse types of rating systems, risk 
stratification methods, and varied approaches to on-site visits. The sense of 
dissonance between oversight activities and µeveryday work¶ in trusts remains, and 
with it a limited ability to influence improvement.27 
 
Oversight of quality and safety has been in place for nearly 20 years within the 
NHS.30 Each regulator has been criticized and then replaced with ever more complex 
solutions promising to remedy the ills of previous structures and institutions. If 
increasing regulation has not delivered improvement, then it may be time to consider 
reducing the administrative burden of inspection and regulation, and monitoring the 
costs and effects of doing so.  
 
Future research should focus on the effect of external oversight on other outcomes of 
care, such as risk-adjusted mortality, waiting times and emergency readmissions, to 
increase certainty about the effects of these systems. The NHS needs evidence of the 
cost-effectiveness of CQC external oversight. Finally, exploring the relationship 
between the CQC rating systems and specific outcome measures may help establish 
the validity of the instruments used. 
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